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Abstract
Background:  Most of the about 140 million informal sector workers in urban China do not have
health insurance. A 1998 central government policy leaves it to the discretion of municipal
governments to offer informal sector workers in cities voluntary participation in a social health
insurance for formal sector workers, the so-called 'basic health insurance' (BHI).
Methods: We used the contingent valuation method to assess the maximum willingness to pay
(WTP) for BHI among informal sector workers, including unregistered rural-to-urban migrants, in
Wuhan City, China. We selected respondents in a two-stage self-weighted cluster sampling
scheme. 
Results: On average, informal sector workers were willing to pay substantial amounts for BHI (30
Renminbi (RMB), 95% confidence interval (CI) 27-33) as well as substantial proportions of their
incomes (4.6%, 95% CI 4.1-5.1%). Average WTP increased significantly when any one of the
copayments of the BHI was removed in the valuation: to 51 RMB (95% CI 46-56) without
reimbursement ceiling; to 43 RMB (95% CI 37-49) without deductible; and to 47 RMB (95% CI 40-
54) without coinsurance. WTP was higher than estimates of the cost of BHI based on past health
expenditure or on premium contributions of formal sector workers. Predicted coverage with BHI
declined steeply with the premium contribution at low contribution levels. 
When we applied equity weighting in the aggregation of individual WTP values in order to adjust
for inequity in the distribution of income, mean WTP for BHI increased with inequality aversion
over a plausible range of the aversion parameter. Holding other factors constant in multiple
regression analysis, for a 1% increase in income WTP for BHI with different copayments increased
by 0.434-0.499% (all p < 0.0001), and for a 1% increase in past health care expenditure WTP
increased by 0.076-0.148% (all p < 0.0004).  Being male, a migrant, or without permanent
employment significantly decreased WTP for BHI. Education was not a significant determinant of
WTP for BHI. 
Conclusion: Our results suggest that Chinese municipal governments should allow informal
sector workers to participate in the BHI. From a normative perspective, BHI for informal sector
workers is likely to increase social welfare because average WTP for BHI is significantly higher than
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estimates of the average cost of BHI. We further find that informal sector workers do not value
the BHI as a mechanism to recover the relatively frequent but small financial losses associated with
common illnesses, but because it protects against the rare but large financial losses associated with
catastrophic care. From a behavioural perspective, our results predict that at a price equal to the
average premium contribution of formal sector workers 35% of informal sector workers will enrol
in the BHI. Subsidies and changes in insurance attributes (e.g. including catastrophic care and
portability) should be effective in increasing BHI coverage. In addition, coverage should expand with
rising incomes among informal sector workers in China. Finally, adverse selection will be unlikely
to be a large problem, if the BHI is offered to informal sector workers.
Background
Health insurance coverage in China's cities is linked to
employment. Most formal sector employees are currently
covered by one of three social health insurance systems.
The Labour Insurance System (LIS, laobao yiliao) and the
Government Insurance System (GIS, gongfei yiliao) were
established in 1951 and 1952, respectively [1]. The LIS
covers workers in large state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and collective-owned enterprises (COEs); the GIS covers
current and retired government staff as well as college and
university students [2-4]. In 1998, a third social health
insurance for urban formal sector workers, the so-called
Basic Health Insurance (BHI, jiben yiliao baoxian), was cre-
ated by a central government decision. The BHI covers all
those who are eligible for LIS or GIS and, additionally, for-
mal workers in private sector companies and smaller pub-
lic enterprises [5-8]. The BHI has replaced the LIS and GIS
in a number of Chinese cities and should, according to the
1998 decision, completely replace the LIS and GIS in all
Chinese cities over time. It has been estimated that in
2003, 27% [9,10] to 30% [11] of China's 500 million
urban residents had BHI coverage and 25% [11] to 27%
[9] had other health insurance coverage (including LIS,
GIS and commercial health insurance), while between
45% [11] and 46% [9] did not have any health insurance.
In contrast to formal sector workers, most informal sector
workers in Chinese cities do not have health insurance.
Until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 almost
all workers in urban China were employed in the formal
sector. Since the Chinese market reforms in the 1980s,
however, the number of informal sector workers has risen
dramatically as public sector enterprises laid off large
numbers of employees and rural-to-urban migration
increased. Most laid-off workers and rural-to-urban
migrants have found (re-)employment in the informal
rather than in the formal sector and are thus not eligible
for health insurance coverage either in the GIS, LIS or BHI.
Figure 1 shows the changes in employment structure in
urban China from 1990 to 2002 based on Ghose (2005)
[12]. By 2002, 57% of all urban workers (or 139 million
people) were employed in the informal sector. The growth
of the informal sector workforce in the past ten years is
not unique to China. In many other Asian countries, sim-
ilar trends have been observed [13].
Lack of health insurance coverage in China impedes
access to health care [14]. Chinese health statistics show
that 20% of urban residents forgo hospital inpatient care
recommended by a health care professional because they
are unable to pay for it [15]. Lack of health insurance is
also a major cause of poverty in China [16]. A recent sur-
vey found that more than 32 million people in China (or
3% of the population) live in poverty (defined as living on
less than $1.08 per day at 1993 purchasing power parity)
because of out-of-pocket spending for health care [17].
One option to try to ensure that informal sector workers
in urban China have access to health care and are pro-
tected against the financial risk of health expenditure is to
include them in the BHI. The 1998 central government
policy on BHI leaves it to the discretion of municipal gov-
ernments to offer voluntary participation in the BHI to
informal sectors workers [5,7,18]. To provide urban infor-
mal workers, especially rural-to-urban migrants, access to
basic health care is one of China's current development
priorities [19,20].
Structure of urban employment in China, 1990–2002 Figure 1
Structure of urban employment in China, 1990–2002.
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We used the contingent valuation method to assess the
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for BHI among infor-
mal sector workers in Wuhan City, China. The BHI as stip-
ulated by the central government decision covers a
comprehensive set of in- and outpatient health services
with a reimbursement ceiling (i.e. the maximum Ren-
minbi (RMB) amount that the BHI will pay per insured
worker in any given year), a deductible (i.e. a fixed RMB
amount that the insured person has to pay out-of-pocket
in any given year before the BHI starts to make payments
for covered benefits), and coinsurance (i.e. the percentage
of health expenditure that the insured person has to pay
out-of-pocket after the deductible has been paid) [8]. In
addition to valuing the BHI as it has been laid out by the
central government (henceforth called baseline BHI), we
asked respondents to value separately three variations of
the BHI (BHI without ceiling, BHI without deductible,
and BHI without coinsurance).
Information about WTP for BHI can be used from a nor-
mative perspective and a behavioural perspective [21].
The maximum WTP equals the compensating gain, i.e. the
income reduction that would maintain a respondent's ini-
tial level of utility, if he or she were provided BHI coverage
[22-24]. From a normative perspective, it can thus be used
as a direct measure of the monetary value of the BHI, for
instance, in a cost-benefit analysis to inform policy mak-
ers about whether it will be socially desirable to provide
the BHI to informal sector workers. From a behavioural
perspective, demand curves constructed from the WTP
results can inform policy makers about the trade-off
between insurance coverage and cost recovery if the BHI
were offered to informal sector workers in the market
place. Our results may further aid in deciding on insur-
ance attributes and designing marketing strategies for the
BHI for informal sector workers.
Methods
Contingent valuation method
Contingent valuation is a survey method to elicit the max-
imum WTP for a good. First, the good and a hypothetical
market in which the good can be bought are described to
the respondent (the contingency). The respondent is then
asked to state the maximum amount s/he would be will-
ing to pay for the good (the valuation). A number of pre-
vious studies have used contingent valuation to measure
the WTP for health insurance in developing countries,
including in rural Burkina Faso [25-28], rural Cameroon
[29,30], rural India [31], rural Iran [32], rural Nigeria
[33], and Ghana [34]. A recent study has assessed the WTP
for private health insurance in four small cities in China
(in Shandong Province and Sichuan Province) [35]. This
study differs from ours in four important aspects. First, its
target population contains all types of registered urban
workers, including public and private formal sector work-
ers, while we focus exclusively on informal sector workers.
Second, it investigates the WTP for different non-compre-
hensive private health insurances (insurance for cata-
strophic diseases vs. inpatient care vs. outpatient care)
without copayments, while our study measures the WTP
to participate in a comprehensive social health insurance
with different copayments. Third, 40% of the sample in
the study had public health insurance (i.e. the insurance
to be valued is supplementary to public health insurance),
while people with health insurance were not eligible to
participate in our study. Fourth, the study took place in
four small cities (one with a population of 110,000 and
three with populations 30,000 – 60,000), while our study
took place in one of China's ten largest cities (with a pop-
ulation of 3.9 million in 1999). Chinese small cities differ
significantly from large cities. They are much less urban-
ized and economically developed than large cities [36]
and have lower insurance coverage [37].
Choice of WTP question format
We chose the payment card format to elicit WTP values.
Respondents were handed a card with a number of mon-
etary values in ascending order and were asked to circle all
those monetary values they would be willing to pay for
the BHI up to and including the maximum amount. The
payment card format was originally developed by Mitch-
ell and Carson [22] and has been used in a number of pre-
vious studies evaluating WTP for health care [38]. It has a
number of advantages over alternative question formats.
Unlike the 'take-it-or-leave it' (TIOLI) format and the bid-
ding game format it does not suffer from starting point
bias and unlike the TIOLI format it does not suffer from
yeah-saying bias [39]. Theoretically, payment card ques-
tions are vulnerable to forms of range bias (i.e. respond-
ents' answers are influenced by the highest monetary
value on the card) and mid-point bias (i.e. respondents
tend to state their maximum WTP in the middle of the
card). However, there is little empirical evidence of the
existence of range bias or mid-point bias [40,41]. In addi-
tion, while the payment card method could give rise to
'protest zeros' (i.e. false zero valuations in order to express
dissent to some attribute of the WTP question), unlike the
open-ended WTP question format it has not been found
to lead to a very high proportion of protest-zero responses
[40-43]. In order to distinguish between protest zeros and
true zeros in this survey, all respondents who did not give
at least one non-zero response to one of the four WTP
questions were asked for the reason for their unwilling-
ness to pay using a multiple choice question with an
open-ended category.
Setting and sample
The survey was conducted between September 1999 and
January 2000 in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China.
Wuhan is a major port and industrial city in central ChinaBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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located alongside the Yangtze River. We chose Wuhan as
the site for this study, because it is typical of the average
Chinese city with regard to age composition, educational
attainment and income [44]. The survey was conducted
by fifteen interviewers who at the time were either gradu-
ate or postgraduate students in Public Health at the
National Centre for Health Management at Tongji Medi-
cal University in Wuhan, China. All of the interviewers
had previously taken part in population-based surveys
and were specifically trained for the WTP survey. The
study was reviewed and approved by the medical ethics
committee of Tongji Medical University. Before the main
survey was conducted, 65 respondents were interviewed
in a pilot survey. As a result of the experiences in the pilot
study, some survey questions were changed.
The target population were informal sector workers in
Wuhan who were at least 18 years of age but not older
than 60 years of age and did not currently have any type
of health insurance. We used an operational definition of
informal sector workers that is similar to one that has
been used in surveys conducted by the International Labour
Office, namely own-account workers (excluding adminis-
trative workers and professionals), unpaid family work-
ers, and employers and employees working in
establishments with less than 10 persons engaged [45].
A sampling frame of all informal sector workers in Wuhan
did not exist because many of the rural-to-urban migrants
in Wuhan are not officially registered. We defined
migrants as survey participants who stated that their
household registration (hukou) was not in Wuhan City. In
order to select a representative sample of informal sector
workers, we chose a two-stage cluster sampling scheme.
Our primary sampling units were sides of city blocks dur-
ing one of two six hour time intervals (8:00 am to 2:00 pm
and 2:00 pm to 8:00 pm), i.e. there were four primary
sampling units per city block. In the first sampling stage,
we randomly selected 60 primary sampling units using a
list of city blocks published by the City Government of
Wuhan. One hour before the start of the selected time
interval, the interviewers went to the selected side of the
city block and drew a map of the people working on the
pavement, on the street, or inside the houses, huts or
other constructions facing the street (see Figure 2 for an
illustration). People who were moving through the street
block and customers were not mapped. The people on the
map were then enumerated. In order to achieve a self-
weighting sampling scheme, in the second sampling stage
an equal proportion (5%) of the mapped individuals in
each primary sampling unit were randomly selected and
asked for their consent to participate in the study [46].
We used estimates of the distribution of cluster sizes and
the average intraclass correlation coefficient from the pilot
to calculate the design effect due to clustering, using an
approximation proposed by Holt [47]. We adjusted the
sample size that would be needed to measure WTP with
the desired precision (95% confidence interval (CI) with
a margin of error of 5 RMB), if a simple random sample
were drawn, in order to take into account clustering (using
the estimated design effect) and refusals. The number of
clusters (60) was chosen for operational reasons. The final
sample size was 651.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire had three parts. First, the interviewers
described the purpose of the study and asked respondents
whether they consented to participate. Second, the inter-
viewers asked participants questions about a number of
individual characteristics. Neither participants' names nor
any other characteristics that would allow identification
of the participants after the interview were elicited or
recorded. Third, the interviewers described the basic
health insurance to the study participants. The description
included the BHI benefits (hospital, outpatient and emer-
gency care), the deductible, coinsurance and reimburse-
ment ceiling (including a picture depicting how different
copayments affect coverage), as well as the payment vehi-
cle for premium contributions (a monthly premium paid
into a city-wide social risk pooling fund managed by the
Primary sampling unit (illustrative) Figure 2
Primary sampling unit (illustrative).
Huts Pavem P ent Street
2 1
4
13
15
14
16
3
5
6
7
8
9
12
11
17
18
20
19
21
Person
(secondary
sampling
unit)
10
Selected
Street
StreetBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
Page 5 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
Wuhan Bureau for Social Security). The benefits as well as
copayments were in line with the 1999 central govern-
ment provisions about the BHI and decisions by the pro-
vincial government of Hubei Province [48,49] and were
implemented in 1999 in at least one city in Hubei Prov-
ince (Yichang) [50]. The deductible was 9% of the average
annual salary of formal sector workers in the jurisdiction
or 700 RMB; the coinsurance was 10% for inpatient serv-
ices, 20% for special procedures such as diagnostic imag-
ing, cancer chemotherapy and dialysis, and 30% for
outpatient services; the reimbursement ceiling was 4 times
the average annual salary of formal sector workers or
30,000 RMB. Respondents were asked about their maxi-
mum WTP for baseline BHI and, separately, its three vari-
ations (i.e. BHI without ceiling, without deductible, and
without coinsurance).
The central government proposal specifies that the BHI
should be administered at the city level. In addition to
payments into a city-wide social risk pooling fund the BHI
for formal sector workers also includes medical savings
accounts (MSA). Money that accrues in the MSA is
reserved to pay for health expenditure. Funds in the MSA
that are unspent at the end of a person's life are inheritable
[51]. We did not include MSA in the specification of the
payment vehicle in the WTP question, because it would
have made the valuation more difficult to understand and
the WTP responses more difficult to interpret (as respond-
ents may value MSAs not only as a form of health insur-
ance but also as a form of life insurance). Further, it is
unclear whether or not the BHI for informal sector work-
ers should include MSA.
Demand curve fitting
Fitting demand curves from WTP data requires the selec-
tion of a functional form. We used the following criteria
in the selection. First, at a premium contribution of zero
all respondents should be willing to obtain the BHI. Sec-
ond, the demand for BHI should (asymptotically) reach
zero. Third, all else equal a simpler functional form
should be preferred over a more complicated one. Fourth,
the functional form should fit the WTP data better than
other functional forms that satisfy the first three criteria
[52]. Experimentation revealed that the simple exponen-
tial model
Q = 100eb*WTP (1) (1)
where
Q = proportion of the sample willing to pay at least the
WTP amount, WTP, satisfied all four criteria. We esti-
mated the exponential model iteratively by least squares
regression.
Equity weighting
In order to evaluate the social benefit of the BHI for infor-
mal sector workers, the individual WTP values need to be
aggregated. One way to aggregate individual WTP is to
sum up the WTP values as they are stated by the respond-
ents, i.e. give everybody's WTP equal weight. However,
WTP is a function of ability to pay. Weighting everybody's
WTP equally will only then lead to results that can be con-
sidered fair if either the current income distribution is fair
or all individuals have identical, linear utility functions. It
is unlikely that the current income distribution in China
is considered fair. For instance, the Chinese government is
currently implementing large anti-poverty programmes in
rural and urban China [53]. There is little empirical sup-
port for linear utility functions [54].
In order to derive a weighting scheme that takes account
of equity concerns in the best possible way (i.e. maximizes
social welfare) one needs to assume specific functional
forms for individuals' utility functions and the social wel-
fare function to be used to aggregate individual utilities.
The choice of the utility function is a matter of empirical
evidence; the choice of the social welfare function
involves a value judgment about society's view on equity.
We assumed that individuals' utility functions are identi-
cal and isoelastic (i.e. income elasticity of marginal utility
is constant)
where
ui = individual i's utility
yi = income
e = income elasticity of marginal utility or 'inequality aver-
sion parameter'
and that the social welfare function is utilitarian, i.e. every
person's utility receives equal weight in the aggregation of
utililities across individuals
where
SW = social welfare.
It can be easily shown that social welfare will be maxi-
mized if individual WTP, WTPi, are aggregated according
to the following weighting scheme
u
y
e
i
i
e
=
−
− ()
()
1
1
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where
 = average income,
i.e. the WTPs of workers with below average income are
given weights greater than one and the WTPs of workers
with above average income are given weights less than one
[54]. The larger is the inequality aversion parameter e, the
more averse to income inequality is a society. Such an
equity weighting has been proposed for use in applied
cost-benefit analysis [55,56]. While there is no published
study about the shape of the marginal utility of income
function in China, there is empirical evidence from India
[55,57] and developed countries [55,58-60] that the mar-
ginal utility of income is indeed constant. Most empirical
studies have found values of e  between 1.0 and 2.0
[58,61]. We thus used three different values of e in our cal-
culations: 0.5, 1.5 and 2.0. Because the BHI pools health
risks at the city level [6], we used the average income in
Wuhan in 2001 as an estimate of  .
Independent variables
We collected information on individual characteristics
that were hypothesized to be determinants or correlates of
WTP for health insurance as independent variables in
multiple regression analysis [39]. We expected WTP to
increase with age (because morbidity increases with age),
income (because, holding other factors constant, higher
income should lead to higher demand of all goods that
are not inferior goods and there is no evidence to suggest
that health insurance is an inferior good), and education
(because individuals who have a low time preference
should be both more likely to invest in education and
more willing to pay for insurance).
In addition, we asked participants about their migration
status, employment status, and health expenditure in the
past year. We hypothesized that migrants have a lower
WTP for BHI than Wuhan residents, because they are
more likely than residents to leave Wuhan in the future
and the BHI reimburses health expenditure only if it
accrues in Wuhan. We further expected that, after control-
ling for income, permanently employed workers have a
higher WTP for health insurance than workers who are
only temporarily employed. The BHI guarantees coverage
only if all monthly contributions have been paid up to the
point in time when health expenditure accrues. Net of
other factors, workers who are in temporary employment
should be more likely than workers in permanent
employment to default on their payments for the BHI in
the future and thus have lower WTP for BHI in the present.
Furthermore, respondents who have incurred higher
health expenditure in the recent past are likely less healthy
than those with lower past health expenditure and should
thus be expected to be willing to pay more for participa-
tion in the BHI. Finally, we included sex as an independ-
ent variable because other studies have found significantly
higher or lower WTP for health insurance among women
than among men [25,30,31,34] (possibly, because gender
roles influence health care-seeking behaviour and health
insurance decisions). We logarithmically transformed the
income variable and the health expenditure variable in
order to reduce skewness in their distributions. See Table
1 for the definitions, means and standard deviations of
the independent variables.
Statistical analyses
On a payment card, the line of all positive WTP amounts
is split into j mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
The true WTP, WTP*, lies between the highest WTP value
circled on the card, PCj, and the next highest value, PCj+1,
y
y
WTP
i
e
i
i
n 





=
∑
1
(4) (4)
y
y
Table 1: Independent variables  (N = 609)
Variable name Definition Mean SD
AGE Age in years 35.6 10.8
MALE Dummy variable = 1 if sex is male, 0 if female 0.49 0.50
EDU2 Dummy variable = 1 if highest educational attainment above elementary school but not above middle school, 0 
otherwise
0.35 0.48
EDU3 Dummy variable = 1 if highest educational attainment above middle school but not above high school, 0 
otherwise
0.39 0.49
EDU4 Dummy variable = 1 if highest educational attainment above high school, 0 otherwise 0.11 0.31
INCOME Monthly income (RMB) 874.8 760.2
MIGRANT Dummy variable = 1 if migration status is migrant, 0 if resident 0.21 0.41
EMPLOY Dummy variable = 1 if employment is permanent, 0 if employment is temporary 0.8 0.40
HEX Average monthly health expenditure in the past year (RMB) 27.4 72.1
SD = standard deviation, RMB = RenminbiBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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where j = 0,..., J. When regressing such an interval-coded
dependent variable against independent variables
WTP* = Xβ + ε
the probability that WTP* falls in the jth category is given
by
P(WTPi* = F(PCj - xiβ/σ) - F(PCj+1 - xiβ/σ)
where F(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribu-
tion function evaluated at (·). The likelihood function is
the product of these probabilities across the j categories
and over the n observations
where δij = 1 if the ith observation falls in the jth category
and 0 otherwise. Estimation of the model based on maxi-
mum likelihood, so-called interval regression, produces
consistent and asymptotically efficient coefficient esti-
mates [62].
Interval regression has been specifically recommended as
the most appropriate regression method for analyzing
results from contingent valuation studies using the pay-
ment card elicitation method [63] and has been used in
many applied contingent valuation studies (e.g. [64,65]).
As a robustness check we ran ordinary least squares regres-
sions (OLS) using the midpoint of the reported WTP
interval. Interval regression and OLS assume that the error
term is normally distributed. Because the distribution of
WTP is skewed, normality of the error terms was more
closely approximated when WTP was logarithmically
transformed. Hence we used the natural logarithm of WTP
as our dependent variables (i.e. we logarithmically trans-
formed the boundaries of the payment card intervals for
interval regression and the midpoint of the payment card
intervals for OLS regression). We estimated
lnWTPi = β0 + β1 AGEi + β2 MALEi + β3 EDU2i + β4 EDU3i 
+ β5 EDU4i + β6 lnINCOMEi + β7 MIGRANTi + β8 EMPLOYi 
+ β9 lnHEXi + εi
We adjusted the standard errors of the means of the
unweighted and equity weighted WTP values, as well as
the standard errors of the regression coefficients for intra-
class correlation due to the clustering of individuals in the
primary sampling units [66]. All analyses were performed
with Stata 9.0 (Stata Corporation, College Station, Texas,
USA).
Results
Sample
Out of 651 people who were asked whether they would be
willing to participate in the study 621 consented to partic-
ipate. Among the 621 participants 65 (i.e. 10.5%)
answered zero to all four WTP questions. 11 answers were
classified as protest zeros because respondents stated that
"the BHI will not cover what it promises to cover" or "gov-
ernment should provide free health care for all" or that
they were "too busy to bother with such things". In addi-
tion to the 11 respondents who gave protest-zero
responses, one respondent was dropped from further
analyses because he did not respond to the WTP ques-
tions, leaving a final sample of 609 respondents for anal-
ysis. The exclusion of protest zeros, did not significantly
change the mean WTP for any of the four BHIs. When
respondents who gave either a protest-zero response or
did not answer the WTP questions were counted as non-
responders, the response rate was 93.5%.
79% of the 609 informal sector workers included in our
final sample were residents in Wuhan, while 21% were
migrants. 80% of the workers had permanent and 20%
had temporary employment (Table 1). Among residents,
69% were self-employed, 27% were employees and 4%
were employers in enterprises with less than 10 people
engaged. Among migrants, 97% were self-employed and
3% were employed in an enterprise with less than 10 peo-
ple engaged. At the time of the study, not one of the
respondents had health insurance coverage.
WTP for different types of BHI
The mean WTPs for baseline BHI and its three variations
are displayed in Table 2. The first row shows the
unweighted values. On average, respondents were willing
to pay significantly more for any of the three variants of
BHI than for the baseline BHI (all p < 0.0001).
In comparison to the baseline BHI, respondents were will-
ing to pay 70% more for BHI without ceiling, 43% more
for the BHI without deductible and 56% more for the BHI
without coinsurance. Among the 609 respondents who
gave valid answers to the four WTP questions only 9, 20
and 27 were willing to pay more for the baseline WTP
than for the BHI without ceiling, the BHI without deduct-
ible, and the BHI without coinsurance, respectively. Mean
WTP ranked as follows: WTP for BHI without ceiling >
WTP for BHI without coinsurance > WTP for BHI without
deductible > WTP for baseline BHI. However, the means
of the WTP for BHI without ceiling, without deductible,
and without coinsurance were not significantly different
from each other at the 5% confidence level.
Respondents were willing to pay substantial proportions
of their income for the different BHIs: 4.6% for the base-
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line BHI (95% CI, 4.1–5.1%); 7.8% for BHI without ceil-
ing (95% CI, 7.0–8.8%); 6.8% for BHI without deductible
(95% CI, 5.9–7.6%); and 6.9% for BHI without coinsur-
ance (95% CI, 6.2–7.8%). Table 3 shows the mean WTP
(and the 95% CI) for the baseline BHI and its three varia-
tions by age group, sex, educational attainment, income
group, migration status, employment status, and past
health expenditure.
Demand curves
Table 4 presents the results of the nonlinear regressions of
BHI coverage against WTP. The coefficients of determina-
tion indicate a near perfect fit. Figure 3 displays the esti-
mated demand curves. Unlike the convention in
economics, quantity (i.e. coverage) is displayed on the y-
axis and price (i.e. WTP or maximum premium contribu-
tion) on the x-axis. At low levels of premium contribution,
coverage declined rapidly with increasing contributions.
For instance, 43% of the sample were willing to pay 20
RMB or more for the baseline BHI, but only 29% were
willing to pay 30 RMB or more.
Equity weighted aggregation of individual WTP
The means of all equity weighted WTP were considerably
higher than the means of the non-equity weighted WTP
and increased with the inequality aversion parameter e. In
Table 3: Willingness to pay for basic health insurance by respondents' characteristics
WTP for 
baseline BHI
WTP for BHI 
without ceiling
WTP for BHI 
without deductible
WTP for BHI 
without coinsurance
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Age group (years)
18–30 33 28–39 55 45–64 51 37–66 51 36–65
31–40 31 26–35 53 45–61 42 36–48 47 39–55
41–50 24 20–28 42 34–50 36 27–44 46 29–64
51–60 26 19–33 45 34–57 34 25–42 39 29–50
Sex
Female 33 29–38 55 47–64 50 39–61 55 42–67
Male 26 23–29 46 41–51 37 33–41 40 35–45
Educational attainment
Elementary school or below 20 15–24 32 25–39 25 20–31 29 22–35
Above elementary school but not above middle school 27 23–31 46 39–53 39 33–45 42 34–50
Above middle school but not above high school 34 29–39 57 48–66 52 38–65 56 41–71
Above high school 39 30–48 70 55–86 53 43–64 60 44–75
Monthly income (RMB)
0–499 15 12–19 26 20–32 23 17–28 22 17–27
500–999 25 23–28 42 38–47 35 32–39 39 34–43
1000 and above 53 44–61 91 75–106 80 58–102 88 63–114
Migration status
Resident 32 28–35 53 48–59 45 38–53 51 42–59
Migrant 23 19–27 41 33–48 35 29–41 34 28–41
Employment status
Temporary employment 19 16–23 33 26–39 27 23–32 27 22–32
Permanent employment 32 29–36 55 49–61 47 40–54 52 44–61
Average monthly health expenditure in the past year (RMB)
0–99 29 26–32 48 43–53 42 36–48 45 38–52
100 and above 45 34–57 92 70–115 64 49–80 83 58–108
WTP = willingness to pay, BHI = basic health insurance, CI = confidence interval, RMB = Renminbi
Table 2: Willingness to pay for basic health insurance (N = 609)
WTP for baseline BHI WTP for BHI without 
ceiling
WTP for BHI without 
deductible
WTP for BHI without 
coinsurance
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Non-equity weighted 30 27–33 51 46–56 43 37–49 47 40–54
Equity weighted
e = 1.0 38 32–43 66 55–76 56 46–65 59 48–70
e = 1.5 67 47–86 121 83–159 102 70–134 107 69–145
e = 2.0 166 93–239 310 170–450 263 145–382 275 133–417
All WTP values in Renminbi.  WTP = willingness to pay, BHI = basic health insurance, CI = confidence intervalBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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comparison to the non-equity weighted WTPs, the mean
WTPs were 1.3 times higher if e = 1.0; 2.3 to 2.4 times
higher if e = 1.5; and 5.9 to 6.1 times higher if e = 2.0. The
ranking of the point estimates of WTP for the different
types of BHI was robust across all three equity weighting
schemes (BHI without ceiling > BHI without coinsurance
> BHI without deductible > baseline BHI) (Table 2). How-
ever, the only significant differences at the 5% confidence
level between means of WTP for different types of BHI
were found between WTP for baseline BHI and each of its
three variations without equity weighting or with equity
weighting and an inequality aversion parameter e of 1.0.
Comparison of WTP to estimates of the costs of BHI
This study did not include a bottom-up calculation of the
costs of the BHI. We estimated BHI costs with two types of
information. First, we approximated costs with the aver-
age premium contribution of a formal sector worker to the
BHI. The baseline BHI for formal sector employees is stip-
ulated to be financed by 4.2% of employees' pre-tax wages
and the resulting contributions are expected to cover the
costs of BHI [6]. The central government policy decrees
that the employer contributes 6% and the employee con-
tributes 2% of the employee's wage to the BHI system [6].
However, only 4.2% of the wages are used to finance the
BHI as described in the WTP question in this study. The
remaining 3.8% are saved in MSA [67]. Participants in the
BHI can use the money in the MSA to pay for health care
which is not reimbursed by the social risk pooling fund
because of the deductible, coinsurance or ceiling of the
BHI [6]. The benefits of the MSA were not included in the
valuations of the baseline BHI in this study. In 2001, aver-
age annual pre-tax income in Wuhan was 7091 RMB [68].
The average monthly cost of BHI was thus estimated to be
24.8 RMB.
Second, we used the respondents' past health expenditure
to approximate the costs of the BHI. Average monthly
health expenditure in the past year was 27.4 RMB (95% CI
21.6–33.1) (see Table 1). If we applied a deductible of
700 RMB, average monthly health expenditure accruing to
the BHI would be reduced to 18.1 RMB (95% CI 12.2–
23.9). If we applied a coinsurance of 10% in addition to
the deductible, average monthly expenditure would be
further reduced (to 16.3 RMB). The mean non-equity
weighted WTP for baseline BHI and all three equity
weighted means of WTP for baseline BHI were signifi-
cantly larger than the above cost estimates.
Determinants of willingness to pay
The explained variation of the multiple regression models
was measured by McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 in interval
regressions and by the coefficient of determination, R2, in
OLS regressions [69]. It ranged from 21% to 28%. All
models were statistically significant (all p < 0.0001). In all
regressions the following factors significantly influenced
WTP: age (AGE; p values between 0.0002 and 0.0356), sex
(MALE; p values between 0.0003 and 0.0538), income
(INCOME; all p < 0.0001), past health expenditure (HEX;
p values between < 0.0001 and 0.0004) and employment
status (EMPLOY; p values between 0.0009 and 0.0324)
(Table 5). Migration status was significant at the 5% con-
fidence level in predicting WTP for baseline BHI, WTP for
BHI without ceiling, and WTP for BHI without coinsur-
ance (MIGRANT; p values between 0.0001 and 0.0475)
and borderline significant in predicting WTP for BHI with-
out deductible (both p < 0.0800). The educational attain-
ment variables (EDU2-4) were neither individually nor
Demand for basic health insurance Figure 3
Demand for basic health insurance.
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Table 4: Demand curve regressions
b t ratio p Adj. R2 Number of data points Sample size
Coverage with baseline BHI -0.0416 -51.77 < 0.0001 0.9987 16 609
Coverage with BHI without ceiling -0.0235 -57.65 < 0.0001 0.9988 20 609
Coverage with BHI without deductible -0.0285 -62.95 < 0.0001 0.9991 18 609
Coverage with BHI without coinsurance -0.0284 -44.57 < 0.0001 0.9979 20 609
BHI = basic health insurance, b = regression coefficientBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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jointly significant in predicting WTP except for highest
educational attainment above high school (EDU4), which
significantly increased WTP in the models labelled 2.1,
3.1, 3.2 and 4.1 in Table 5.
Since we used the natural logarithm of the four WTP as
dependent variables, the coefficients in Table 5 are either
semi-elasticities (if the independent variable is in natural
units) or elasticities (if the independent variable is loga-
rithmically transformed). An increase of one year in age
decreased WTP by between 1.0% and 1.6%. Net of the
other factors included in the regression models, men had
lower WTP than women (between 15.4% and 22.6%
lower), migrants had lower WTP than residents (between
17.4% and 37.3% lower), and informal workers in perma-
nent employment had higher WTP than workers in tem-
porary employment (between 19.1% and 30.0% higher).
A 1% increase in monthly income increased WTP by
between 0.434% and 0.499% and 1% increase in health
expenditure in the past year increased WTP by between
0.076% and 0.148% (Table 5).
The regression results were largely unaffected by the
choice of regression model. The coefficient sizes and the
Table 5: Determinants of willingness to pay
Dependent 
variables
WTP for baseline BHI (ln) WTP for BHI without ceiling 
(ln)
WTP for BHI without 
deductible (ln)
WTP for BHI without 
coinsurance (ln)
Model 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2
Regression Interval 
regression
OLS Interval 
regression
OLS Interval 
regression
OLS Interval 
regression
OLS
AGE -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.010 -0.012
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0052)
0.0010 0.0018 0.0013 0.0017 0.0002 0.0003 0.0356 0.0294
MALE -0.203 -0.221 -0.154 -0.166 -0.198 -0.212 -0.212 -0.226
(0.0558) (0.0635) (0.0756) (0.0843) (0.0643) (0.0721) (0.0670) (0.0745)
0.0003 0.0010 0.0416 0.0538 0.0020 0.0046 0.0016 0.0036
EDU2 0.140 0.148 0.156 0.154 0.219 0.227 0.151 0.150
(0.0978) (0.1097) (0.1260) (0.1409) (0.1126) (0.1260) (0.1076) (0.1187)
0.1527 0.1825 0.2157 0.2786 0.0522 0.0764 0.1614 0.2099
EDU3 0.084 0.083 0.133 0.122 0.207 0.206 0.165 0.163
(0.1182) (0.1311) (0.1424) (0.1579) (0.1424) (0.1575) (0.1264) (0.1390)
0.4761 0.5275 0.3515 0.4443 0.1461 0.1951 0.1913 0.2488
EDU4 0.222 0.230 0.333 0.334 0.347 0.356 0.305 0.302
(0.1527) (0.1682) (0.1645) (0.1827) (0.1561) (0.1734) (0.1470) (0.1622)
0.1458 0.1768 0.0429 0.0724 0.0262 0.0447 0.0379 0.0676
INCOME (ln) 0.439 0.468 0.469 0.499 0.458 0.489 0.434 0.461
(0.0504) (0.0542) (0.0588) (0.0642) (0.0574) (0.0622) (0.0566) (0.0613)
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
MIGRANT -0.345 -0.373 -0.214 -0.224 -0.174 -0.187 -0.287 -0.303
(0.0888) (0.1025) (0.0979) (0.1108) (0.0915) (0.1050) (0.1033) (0.1157)
0.0001 0.0006 0.0285 0.0475 0.0566 0.0800 0.0054 0.0113
EMPLOY 0.224 0.232 0.258 0.273 0.191 0.198 0.290 0.300
(0.0835) (0.0910) (0.0930) (0.1022) (0.0826) (0.0905) (0.0872) (0.0962)
0.0073 0.0133 0.0055 0.0098 0.0209 0.0324 0.0009 0.0028
HEX (ln) 0.076 0.083 0.139 0.148 0.090 0.098 0.087 0.093
(0.0198) (0.0210) (0.0220) (0.0234) (0.0203) (0.0216) (0.0236) (0.0248)
0.0001 0.0002 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
Constant 0.008 -0.266 0.204 -0.026 0.265 0.019 0.182 -0.035
(0.3315) (0.3617) (0.3853) (0.4270) (0.3893) (0.4239) (0.4001) (0.4358)
0.9815 0.4642 0.5957 0.9508 0.4965 0.9643 0.6495 0.9363
N 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609
F 22.7 23.1 21.7 19.11
Log likelihood -1308 -1486 -1433 -1475
R2 0.247 0.259 0.242 0.213
McKelvey and 
Zavoina's R2
0.266 0.277 0.257 0.224
p value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
The numbers in the cells are regression coefficient, heteroscedasticity-robust standard error adjusted for clustering of the data in 60 primary 
sampling units (in brackets) and p value.
WTP = willingness to pay, BHI = basic health insurance, OLS = ordinary least squares regression, ln = natural logarithmBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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significance levels in the OLS regression models were sim-
ilar to those in the interval regression models. Only two
coefficients differed by more than 10%. The age coeffi-
cients in the OLS regression models labelled 2.2 and 4.2
in Table 5 were respectively 14% and 20% lower than the
age coefficients in the corresponding interval regressions
(models 2.1 and 4.1 in Table 5).
Discussion
Validity of WTP
Most informal sector workers in Wuhan are currently not
eligible to participate in the BHI (see below). If the City
Government of Wuhan decides to open the BHI to a
broad range of informal sector workers, this study will
offer a rare opportunity to assess the criterion validity of
WTP responses by comparing actual demand to demand
predicted from a contingent valuation study. For now, we
can only examine the construct validity of the WTP
responses, i.e. investigate whether WTP relates to certain
constructs as predicted by theory. Two commonly used
tests of construct validity of WTP are the income elasticity
test and the scope test [70]. With the rare exception of
inferior goods, demand theory predicts that income elas-
ticity of goods is positive and there is no evidence to sug-
gest that health insurance is an inferior good. We found
that the income elasticity of BHI is indeed positive after
controlling for sex, age, migration status, employment sta-
tus and health expenditure. Our results thus pass the
income elasticity test.
The scope test assesses whether WTP increases as more of
a good is supplied [71,72]. We found that mean WTP sig-
nificantly increases and that the demand curve is shifted
upward as the scope of the BHI increases, i.e. as either the
reimbursement ceiling, the deductible or the coinsurance
are removed from the baseline BHI. A few respondents
were willing to pay less for one of the variants of BHI than
for the baseline BHI. However, this does not imply that
the answers of these respondents are invalid. While the
removal of the ceiling, the deductible or the coinsurance
never decreases the scope of the BHI, respondents may
truly value the BHI variants less than the baseline BHI
because they associate other changes in the BHI with the
change in scope. For instance, a respondent may expect
that the BHI without coinsurance will be less sustainable
than the BHI with coinsurance and thus value the former
less than the latter.
Weaker tests of construct validity of WTP responses
include assessments of the relationship between respond-
ents' characteristics other than income. All our independ-
ent variables influenced WTP for BHI as hypothesized,
with two exceptions. First, WTP decreases significantly
with age. We had hypothesized that WTP for health insur-
ance would be a positive function of age because the risk
of disease increases with age. However, it is plausible that
age not only proxies for disease risk but is also associated
with factors that are not controlled for in our regression
analyses and are negatively associated with WTP for BHI.
Younger informal sector workers may be more likely than
older workers to be employed in occupations that carry a
high risk of accidents, for instance in construction. Also,
the age variable may capture cohort effects. For instance,
older informal sector workers may believe that their chil-
dren will finance their health care should they become ill,
while younger workers do not.
Second, the relationship between education and WTP was
not very strong. We had hypothesized that higher educa-
tion leads to higher WTP for BHI, because people who dis-
count the future at a lower rate both invest more in their
education and are willing to pay more in order to insure
against future health expenditure. However, it seems plau-
sible that educational attainment in China has in the past
not been determined by preferences but by factors such as
place of birth, party affiliation or early educational per-
formance. Overall, tests of construct validity suggest that
the results of our contingent valuation study are valid.
Policy relevance
Health policy in China is formulated centrally, but decen-
tralization has given lower levels of government power to
adapt policies from higher levels to local circumstances,
leading to a situation where "governments at all levels are
both policy-makers and policy-implementers" [9]. Dis-
crepancies between central policy directives and local pol-
icy implementation have been observed for several health
policies in China, such as disease control policies [73] and
health care price setting [74].
The introduction of the BHI in Chinese cities is an exam-
ple of the simultaneity of policy formulation and imple-
mentation at the local level. While the 1998 central
government policy includes detailed directives about the
attributes of the BHI (e.g. the proportions of a formal sec-
tor worker's salary that employer and employee need to
contribute to the BHI) [6], some municipal governments
have implemented modified versions of the BHI, for
instance in Shanghai and Beijing [75,76]. Municipal gov-
ernments have even more discretion in making decisions
about expanding BHI to informal sector workers. The
1998 central government policy allows such an expan-
sion, but does not require it. Recently, however, different
levels of the Chinese government within and outside the
health sector have called for improved social protection,
including health insurance, for urban informal sector
workers [20,77-79].
In 2004, the City Government of Wuhan issued the
Wuhan City regulation about basic health insurance for urbanBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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informal sector workers. The regulation defines the eligibil-
ity criteria for participation in the BHI such that most
informal workers are, in fact, barred from joining [80].
First, only those informal sector workers who have a per-
manent household registration (hukou) in Wuhan can
join, which excludes migrant workers from participation.
Second, men can only join if they have been enrolled in
the state-run old-age pension scheme for at least 30 years
and women can only join if they have been enrolled for at
least 25 years. Since only formal sector workers are enti-
tled to participate in the state-run old-age pension
scheme, this second condition effectively prevents all
informal sector workers from participating in the BHI
who have never worked in the formal sector. Moreover, it
excludes all men who were laid-off after less than 30 years
of formal sector work and all women who were laid-off
after less than 25 years from joining the BHI. Third, men
younger than 16 or older than 60 years of age and women
younger than 16 or older than 55 years of age are not eli-
gible to participate in the BHI. The upper age limits pre-
vent many of those few former formal sector workers who
have been working long enough in the formal sector to
meet the second eligibility criterion from participating in
the BHI, because they are too old.
A few cities in China allow broader categories of informal
sector workers to participate in the BHI if they contribute
the same proportion of their incomes as formal sector
workers or pay premiums similar to the average absolute
premium paid by formal workers [77,81,82]. However,
participation in these voluntary BHI schemes has been
low [82]. Workers in the formal sector pay only a part of
the total contribution directly from their salaries, while
their employers pay the remainder. In contrast, informal
sector workers usually have to pay the total contribution
from their own incomes because they are either self-
employed or employed in small-scale enterprises that do
not contribute to their employees' insurance coverage
[83].
This is the first study to investigate WTP to participate in
social health insurance among informal sector workers in
a large Chinese city. Many factors, such as political will
and financial, managerial and technical resources, will
influence municipal governments' decisions to offer
informal sector workers participation in the BHI. Our
study may support the decision making by providing evi-
dence about the social desirability of the BHI, preferences
for BHI attributes, and characteristics of informal sector
workers that influence the valuation of BHI.
On average, informal workers are willing to pay substan-
tial absolute amounts and substantial proportions of their
incomes to obtain social health insurance coverage. We
find that average WTP is significantly higher than esti-
mates of average cost of BHI based on the premium con-
tributions of formal sector workers and past health
expenditure of informal sector workers. From a normative
perspective, the provision of the BHI to informal sector
workers should thus increase social welfare.
Whether the net benefits of the BHI will be positive or not
depends on the validity of our cost estimates. For our first
cost estimate – the average premium contribution of for-
mal sector workers – to accurately represent the average
cost of BHI, the contribution rates that are stipulated in
the 1998 central government policy need to be sufficiently
high, so that the total premium contributions to the BHI
cover total costs. The fact that in their implementation of
the BHI for formal sector workers some cities have chosen
contribution rates that are higher than the rates stipulated
by the central government suggests that this assumption
may not hold true [67]. For instance, in Shanghai employ-
ers are required to contribute 10% of an employee's
annual wage to the BHI, while employees contribute 2%
[75]. Even if the stipulated rates did lead to contributions
that are sufficient to cover the costs of BHI for formal sec-
tor workers, they might not lead to contributions suffi-
cient to cover the costs of BHI for informal sector workers,
for instance because the latter face higher risks of work-
related injuries and diseases than the former [82].
For our second cost estimate – the informal sector work-
ers' past health expenditure, to approximate well the cost
of BHI – the demand for health care must not be affected
by insurance. However, insurance is likely to change the
demand for health care because it decreases the price of
health care (as well as workers' disposable incomes), and
may lead to increased moral hazard behaviours.
While our cost estimates may thus be too low, the esti-
mates of the benefits of BHI that do not take into account
aversion to income inequality may underestimate the true
size of the benefits from BHI. The equity weighted mean
WTPs for BHI are much higher than non-equity weighted
mean WTPs. If we assume, for instance, that the correct
inequality aversion parameter for China is 1.5, the bene-
fits of the BHI will be more than twice as high as the
unweighted benefit estimates, so that net social benefit
will be positive, unless costs have been underestimated by
more than a factor 2. One indication that Chinese society
is indeed inequality averse is that Chinese policy makers
have stipulated that formal sector workers should contrib-
ute an equal proportion of their incomes to the BHI, i.e.
to receive BHI coverage workers with higher incomes are
required to pay larger absolute amounts into the social
risk pooling fund than workers with lower incomes.
From a behavioural perspective, our result that coverage
declines steeply with increasing premium contributions atBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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low contribution levels suggests that government subsi-
dies would be an effective mechanism to increase cover-
age with BHI among informal sector workers. Our results
further suggest that informal sector workers do not value
the BHI as a mechanism to recover the relatively frequent
but small financial losses associated with common ill-
nesses but because it protects against the rare but large
financial losses associated with catastrophic care. The
informal sector workers in our sample state a WTP that is
on average higher than their health expenditure in the
past year. In fact, only 62 of the 609 respondents would
have received any money from the BHI at the level of their
past year's health care spending; all other workers spent
less on health care than the deductible. Nevertheless most
workers are willing to pay positive amounts for the BHI,
suggesting that workers value the protection against rare
diseases that are expensive to treat. This conclusion is
strengthened by our finding that average WTP for BHI
increases significantly when the ceiling on coverage is
removed, even though not one of the informal sector
workers in our sample had health expenditure exceeding
the ceiling in the past year.
A recent study investigated WTP for private health insur-
ance in four small cities in China's Shandong and Sichuan
Provinces [35]. As described above, this study differs from
ours in important aspects, including the target popula-
tion, the type of insurance and the setting. Nevertheless, it
is interesting that the study finds that respondents value
insurance for catastrophic diseases (such as cancer and
end-stage renal disease) and inpatient care more highly
than insurance for outpatient care. This reinforces our
finding that people in urban China value financial protec-
tion against catastrophic care expenditure more highly
than recovery of costs of treating minor diseases.
Our results suggest three potential limitations of a volun-
tary BHI for informal sector workers. First, voluntary BHI
for informal sector workers may suffer from some adverse
selection. We find that WTP increases significantly with
health expenditure in the past year. As past health expend-
iture proxies future health expenditure [84] at any given
premium contribution those who take out the BHI would
be expected to incur higher health expenditure than those
who do not. However, while past health expenditure sig-
nificantly increases WTP, the effect is not very large. A
10% increase in past health expenditure leads to 0.76%
increase in WTP for baseline BHI and to a 1.39% increase
in WTP for BHI without ceiling. In comparison, a 10%
increase in income will lead to a 4.39% increase in WTP
for baseline BHI and a 4.69% increase in WTP for BHI
without ceiling.
Second, large proportions of informal sector workers will
choose not to buy the BHI at relatively low contribution
levels. At a price of 25 RMB per month (i.e. our estimate
of average monthly costs of the BHI based on the contri-
butions of formal sector workers) 35% of informal sector
workers will buy the BHI. At a price of 20 RMB coverage
of informal sector workers will increase to 43%.
In order to increase coverage, policy makers should con-
sider changing the attributes of the BHI. According to our
results, at any given premium contribution the coverage
that will be achieved if informal sector workers were
offered the BHI without ceiling, without deductible or
without coinsurance will be higher than the coverage that
can be achieved if they are offered the baseline BHI. While
the average WTP for BHI without ceiling is not signifi-
cantly higher than the average WTP for BHI without
deductible or coinsurance, almost all respondents ranked
the BHI without ceiling highest (by the WTP criterion)
among the four different types of BHI offered. Including
catastrophic care cover in the BHI would have the addi-
tional advantage of improving the effectiveness of the BHI
in ensuring access to needed health care and averting pov-
erty, while removing the deductible or the coinsurance
may come with the disadvantage of increasing consumer
moral hazard. Our findings suggest that even if the gov-
ernment decides neither to subsidise nor change the BHI,
coverage will increase over time as the Chinese economy
continues to grow (because WTP for BHI increases signif-
icantly with income).
Third, at any given premium the most vulnerable infor-
mal workers will be least likely to buy the BHI. Holding
other factors equal, workers who do not buy the BHI will
on average be older, poorer, and more likely to be
migrants and without permanent employment than
workers who do buy the BHI. In order to increase coverage
amongst the most vulnerable workers, policy makers may
consider a number of means, including targeted public
marketing campaigns, specific subsidies (for instance for
older workers) or changes to the BHI that specifically
increase the attractiveness of the BHI for vulnerable work-
ers (for instance, portability of the BHI may increase cov-
erage amongst migrants).
Conclusion
Our results suggest that Chinese municipal governments
should allow informal sector workers to participate in the
BHI. From a normative perspective, BHI for informal sec-
tor workers is likely to increase social welfare. The
increases in social welfare are likely to be larger if Chinese
society is averse to income inequality. Our results further
suggest that informal sector workers do not value the BHI
as a mechanism to recover the relatively frequent but
small financial losses associated with common illnesses,
but because it protects against the rare but large financial
losses associated with catastrophic care.BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:114 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/114
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From a behavioural perspective, at a price level equal to
the average premium contribution of formal sector work-
ers 35% of informal workers should be expected to enrol
in the BHI. Because coverage declines steeply with increas-
ing premium contributions at low contribution levels,
subsidies could be an effective means to increase coverage.
According to our results, modifications of the copayment
structure of the BHI, such as eliminating the reimburse-
ment ceiling, or changes in other attributes, such as
including portability, could increase population coverage.
Moreover, coverage should expand as the Chinese econ-
omy continues to grow. Finally, adverse selection will be
unlikely to be a large problem if the BHI is offered to
informal sector workers.
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